In cognitive science, beliefs are propositional attitudes, where the world is depicted as being in some state or another (Schwitzgebel, 2021). Beliefs have two main properties: some representational content and assumed veracity (Stephens and Graham, 2004). Beliefs entail specific representational content, which portrays causes of sensations (agency, events, and objects) as being a specific way (Rimell, 2021). So understood, they are undoubtedly a central part of cognition, dictating our perceptions, behavior, and executive functions. Beliefs do not need to be conscious or linguistically articulated, and indeed, the majority of beliefs can be construed as subpersonal; ie, remain unconscious (Majeed, 2022). Rational agents generally view beliefs as having a truth value, and update their beliefs in light of new evidence. The term “belief” is also used to denote a more deflationary sense, where what is at stake is merely a probability density over some support; where we call a belief a probabilistic assessment of how plausible some state of affairs is (Smets, 2005). On this probabilistic reading, beliefs acquire the attribute of uncertainty—or its complement precision. Beliefs provide the foundation that allows agents to understand—or at least make sense of—the world and act within it: they provide agents with a consistent and coherent representation of their world, which they can then use to make inferences about the causal structure of the world and their place within it (Churchland and Churchland, 2013). This scaffolding of beliefs helps [human] agents appraise the environment, explain new observations, construct shared perspectives on the world, and engage in goal-directed behavior. Beliefs also help us experience the world temporally, as they can represent the state of the world in the past and allow us to anticipate its state in the future; this is especially important when holding beliefs about the consequences of action—a prerequisite for planning and a sense of agency (Shipp et al., 2009).